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W1u.s-CoNTRACT To DEVISE-RIGHTS OF SUBSEQUENT SPousE WITH
NOTICE OF PRIOR CONTRACT AT TIME OF MARRIAGE-Decedent and his first
wife executed reciprocal wills pursuant to a contract appearing on the
face of the instruments. Each gave the other a life estate, with remainders
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to substantially identical beneficiaries. After his first wife's death, decedent
remarried and in an antenuptial contract agreed to bequeath a sum of
money to his second wife in lieu of all her claims against his estate.
The second wife had actual notice of the prior agreement at the time
of their marriage. Decedent then executed a new will which expressly
revoked all prior wills, confirmed the terms of the antenuptial contract,
and made further dispositions inconsistent with the first will. After his
death the beneficiaries of the first will sought to impress decedent's estate
with a trust in their favor. The trial court allowed their claim, but
directed that the lien on the estate should be inferior to the antenuptial
contract rights of the widow. On appeal, held, affirmed. The agreement
embodied in the reciprocal will cannot be enforced against the widow's
rights, even if she had actual riotice of that agreement at the time of her
marriage. Boner's Admx. v. Chesnut's Exr., (Ky. 1958) 317 S.W. (2d) 867.
Several jurisdictions regard property subject to a contract to devise as
immune from the claims of a surviving spouse who married the promisor
after the contract was executed.1 These courts assert that the promisee or
beneficiary of the contract acquires an equitable interest in the property
when the contract is executed, and that the interest of a surviving spouse
cannot attach to property in which the promisor had bare legal title during
coverture.2 In other jurisdictions, a surviving spouse may assert a primary
claim even though the property concerned is ostensibly subject to a
contract to devise. 3 Utilizing the discretionary nature of the equitable relief
to which the contract beneficiaries ordinarily resort, 4 the courts have
applied a confusing array of equitable principles as bases for refusing to
enforce the agreement to the detriment of the surviving spouse. Typical
are the assertions that the widow's rights are indefeasible except by her

1 Price v. Craig, 164 Miss. 42, 143 S. 694 (1932): Smith v. Smith, 340 Ill. 34, 172 N.E.
32 (1930); Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (1910); Burdine v. Burdine's Exr.,
98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992 (1900).
2 In re Davis' Estate, 171 Kan. 605, 237 P. (2d) 396 (1951); Harris v. Harris, 130 W.
Va. 100, 43 S.E. (2d) 225 (1947). However, the promisor retains the power to make an
inter vivos disposition of his property in good faith during his life, since the parties
impliedly agree that only the property held by him at his death is subject to the contract.
Bell v. Pierschbacher, 245 Iowa 436, 62 N.W. (2d) 784 (1954). See Sample v. Butler University, 211 Ind. 122, 4 N.'E. (2d) 545 (1937); 108 A.LR. 867 (1937). In the principal case,
the widow's interest was treated as essentially ·testamentary, although her interest was
based on a contract executed by the promisor during his lifetime.
3 Owens v. ,McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710 (1896); Wides v. Wides' Exr., 299 Ky.
103, 184 S.W. (2d) 579 (1944); Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129
S.W. (2d) 905 (1939): In re Arland's Estate, 131 Wash. 297, 230 P. 157 (1924); Mayfield v.
Cook, 201 Ala. 187, 77 S. 713 (1918); Gall v. Gall, 64 Hun (N.Y.) 600, 19 N.Y.S. 332 (1892).
See Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. (1 Beasley) 142 (1858).
4 The fact that the contract was embodied in the wills does not change the nature
of the remedy. As a •will, the instrument is ambulatory and subject to revocation. When
revoked, the promisee must resort to the contract embodied in the instruments. 4 PAGE,
LAw OF WILLS, 3d ed., §1709 (1941). As to the precise nature of the remedy, see id., §1736.
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voluntary act, 5 that the widow's position is the same as that of a purchaser
for value without notice, 6 or that equity will not enforce a contract if the
necessary result is to harm after-acquired rights of third parties.7 All
these positions overlook the basic question of how the widow ever acquires
rights in property subject to a contract to devise at the time of her marriage.
The most satisfactory explanation, adopted by several courts, is based on
the principle that restraints on marriage are void as against public policy.
If the parties to the contract intend to subordinate interests which might
arise from a subsequent marriage, the contract would be an unenforceable
restraint upon marriage. Since they undoubtedly intended their agreement
to be effective, however, it must be assumed that they contemplated that
a subsequent marriage would give the surviving spouse of the promisor
legal rights in the property otherwise subject to the contract.8 But lack
of notice of the prior agreement at the time of marriage is commonly
asserted to be essential if the spouse is to be permitted to claim an interest
superior to that of the contract beneficiaries.9 Rejection of this requirement
by the principal case seems to be based on sound logic. The intent of the
contracting parties is determined by policy considerations which view
with disfavor any attempt to impair the rights of a surviving spouse. No
change in this policy occurs when the spouse incidentally acquires knowledge of the contract before marriage. The event of marriage •is the basis
for creation of the interest of the surviving spouse. In the absence of
fraud, 10 the simple occurrence of this event should suffice to subject the
property to the interest of the surviving spouse, at least where the entire
estate of the promisor is concerned in the contract to devise. 11 The
contract is ordinarily construed as encompassing only the property remain-

5 Wides v. Wides' Exr.,
6 In re Arland's Estate,

note 3 supra.
note 3 supra.

7Ibid.
8 Owens v. McNally, note 3 supra; -Mayfield v. Cook, note 3 supra; Wides v. Wides'
Exr., note 3 supra; Gall v. Gall, note 3 supra; Van Duyne v. Vreeland, note 3 supra. The
contract remains enforceable to the extent marital rights are not impaired. See Ver
Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., note 3 supra.
9 Owens v. McNally, note 3 supra; Mayfield v. Cook, note 3 supra. See 4 PAGE, WILLS,
3d ed., §1730 (1941). But see Wides v. Wides' Exr., 300 Ky. 344, 188 S.W. (2d) 471 (1945),
where the trial court's exclusion of evidence bearing on actual notice was upheld on
appeal. Strangely, this decision was not cited in the principal case. For a discussion of
the effect of the second Wides decision, see Sparks, "Enforcement of Contracts To Devise
or Bequeath After the Death of the Promiser," 39 MINN. L. REv. 1, n. 197 (1954).
10 See Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 46, 113 P. (2d) 495 (1941).
11 Decisions attributing a superior interest to the widow over specific legacies [In· re
Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. 512, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 107 (1940)] or specific devises [Ver Standig
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., note 3 supra] made pursuant to a contract to devise are
without justification, if there remains adequate property in the estate to satisfy her
claixns apart from property subject to the contract. See Sparks, "Contract To Devise or
Bequeath as an Estate Planning Device," 20 Mo. L. REv. 1 at 11 (1955).
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ing in the promisor's net estate at the time of his death.12 It does not seem
unreasonable to conclude that a subsequent marriage is a contingency
contemplated by the parties which works a change in the promisor's
assets during his lifetime. Actual notice has no effect in changing a
result based on dictates of public policy requiring protection for the
surviving spouse.1 s
Glenn O. Fuller

12 See

note 1 supra.
the claim of the surviving spouse in the principal case was based on an
antenuptial contract does not alter the basic issues. The sum promised the widow was
given in lieu of the marital interest to ,be claimed upon her spouse's death, which is
the same interest the courts :have sought to protect in other cases. The fact that the
spouse's interest under the contract was less than her statutory rights may have been
influential in causing the court to hold that actual notice was irrelevant.
18 That

